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FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS: EXCLUSION OF THE PRESS FROM
PRETRIAL HEARINGS-State ex rel. Dayton Newspapers v. Phillips,
46 Ohio St. 2d 457, 351 N.E.2d 127 (1976).
Sensational crimes are often the focal point of extensive news
coverage. If the media's reporting is objective, it may not significantly infringe upon the defendant's right to a fair trial as guaranteed by the fifth' and sixth2 amendments. Extensive pretrial publicity, however, necessarily raises the possibility of prejudice,' even
though the information reported may be true. Despite the fact that
the coverage may have resulted from the defendant's misdeeds, he
is nevertheless entitled to be tried by persons who have not prejudged his case.' It is the duty of the trial judge to determine
whether the news coverage raises the possibility of prejudice in the
5
community from which the jury is to be selected. If the trial judge
finds that the defendant's right to a fair trial is in jeopardy, there
are several possible remedies.' One method which has been resorted
to infrequently is the exclusion of the press from the court proceedings. Given that the press has the right to publish news concerning
criminal cases, it is questionable whether the news media can be
7
excluded without infringing upon its first amendment right. In
State ex rel. Dayton Newspapers v. Phillips,' the Supreme Court of
1. The fifth amendment to the Constitution of the United States in pertinent part
provides: "No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
"
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law ..
2. The sixth amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides: "In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
"
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed ..
This is applicable to state criminal prosecutions via Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149,
rehearing denied, 392 U.S. 947 (1968).
3. See, e.g., Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532,
rehearing denied, 382 U.S. 875 (1965); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963); Irvin v.
Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
4. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
5. Id. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. at 362-63; see the following cases for an
analysis of the standard to be employed in determining whether the published utterances
substantially interfere with the orderly administration of justice: Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S.
367 (1947); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252
(1941); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
6. The Court in Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 358-63 discussed the various methods the trial
judge may use to assure the defendant a fair trial. The following are illustrative: change of
venue, continuances, sequestering the jury, extensive voir dire, contempt sanctions, limitations on court personnel and media presence, dismissal, and new trial.
7. The first amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides that: "Congress shall make no law. . . abridging the freedom . . . of the press." The due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment protects this liberty from invasion by state action. Schneider
v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 160 (1939). Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 707 (1931).
8. 46 Ohio St. 2d 457, 351 N.E.2d 127 (1976).
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Ohio held that the first amendment right is absolute,' and exclusion
of the press from pretrial hearings is an unacceptable method of
protecting the defendant's right to a fair trial.'" The court held that
methods other than those likely to inhibit the exercise of the first
amendment must be used to protect the defendant's right to a fair
and impartial trial."
I.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Lester Emoff, the owner of a chain of furniture stores in the
Dayton area, was kidnapped and held for ransom on September 23,
1975. Shortly thereafter, it was discovered that Emoff had been
brutally murdered. Herman Lee Moore and two others were arrested
and charged with the murder. From September 24, 1975 through
November 4, 1975, a total of forty-two days, over seventy newspaper
accounts appeared. The coverage included details of the murder,
the payment of ransom, the police investigation, and the court proceedings, as well as the defendants' backgrounds. Local television
also covered the incident extensively.
Due to the allegedly prejudicial pretrial publicity, defendant
Moore moved that the pretrial hearing concerning suppression of
evidence, statements, and pretrial identification of the accused be
closed to the general public and to the news media. In addition,
Moore requested a change of venue. The Common Pleas Court of
Montgomery County found that "the publicity in this matter has
been and would appear to continue to be extremely intense." On
this basis, the court reasoned, a clear and present danger of a serious
and imminent threat to the administration of justice had been created, and in order to prevent the possibility of further prejudicial
pretrial publicity which might affect the right of the defendant to a
fair and impartial trial, the court issued an exclusionary order." The
newspapers then sought a writ of prohibition 3 which was ruled upon
by the Supreme Court of Ohio.
9. Id. at 459, 351 N.E.2d at 130.
10. Id. at 466, 351 N.E.2d at 133.
11. Id. at 464, 351 N.E.2d at 132.
12. It is therefore, ORDERED that the public be excluded from the pretrial suppression motion hearings scheduled to commence Wednesday, November 5, 1975.
Those persons directly involved in this case may be present and no others. Those
entitled to attend shall be the court personnel, the defendant, his attorneys, the Prosecuting Attorney, the necessary witnesses, and counsel for the co-defendants in these
cases.
State of Ohio v. Herman Lee Moore, No. 75-CR-1353 (C.P. Ct. of Montgomery County, Nov.
4, 1975).
13. A writ of prohibition is an extraordinary writ which prevents the trial court from
enforcing an order it has issued. The newspapers filed an original writ of prohibition in the
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II.

DECISION OF THE COURT

The Ohio Supreme Court was confronted with three distinct
issues in this case: first, whether a writ of prohibition was an appropriate remedy for the newspapers' alleged injury; second, whether
the newspapers had standing; and third, the conflict which flowed
from the exclusionary order; i.e., fair trial versus free press. Although the court split 5-2 in its decision, there were four separate
opinions."
The court was primarily concerned with the approach the lower
court should use in this type of case: "[W]hat action should the
court take to guarantee the defendant an impartial jury and preserve unabridged the freedom of the press?"'" The majority believed
that the answer was clear. When confronted with motions for hearings on a change of venue, suppression of evidence, and exclusion
of the public at such hearings, the trial court must remain open to
the public. Only after the completion of a public hearing on the
motions to suppress should a ruling be made on the motion for a
change of venue. If the trial judge then concludes a fair and impartial jury cannot be obtained, the motion for a change of venue
should be granted. The court found that a change of venue was the
most appropriate remedy since it protected the rights of the defendant without infringing on the freedom of the press. Although the
possibility of prejudice may be created by extensive pretrial publicity, the court held that any restriction upon the press' ability to
gather and disseminate news is intolerable. 7 "The polestar in this
case is the constitutional provisions that the freedom and liberty of
the press shall not be abridged or restrained by any law."'" ExcluCourt of Appeals for Montgomery County after the exclusionary order was granted. The
newspapers' action in the court of appeals was then voluntarily dismissed in order to seek an
alternative writ of prohibition in the Supreme Court of Ohio which has original jurisdiction.
OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 2.
14. The majority and Justice Celebreeze, dissenting, held that prohibition was the
appropriate remedy under the circumstances of the case. Those justices were also in agreement on the issue of standing. The newspapers were held to have sufficient interest in the
vindication of first amendment guarantees to qualify them as legitimate litigants. Neither
the concurring opinion of Justice Stern nor the separate dissent of Justice Corrigan dealt with
the initial obstacles of prohibition and standing, but rather focused immediately upon the
fair trial-free, press controversy.
15. 46 Ohio St. 2d at 461, 351 N.E.2d at 130.
16. Id. The majority relied on State ex rel. Beacon Journal Publishing Co. v. Kainrad,
46 Ohio St. 2d 349, 348 N.E.2d 695 (1976); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961); Rideau v.
Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963).
17. The court found that the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States
and article I, § 2 of the Ohio Constitution prohibit any abridgement of the freedom of the
press. 46 Ohio St. 2d at 460, 351 N.E.2d at 130.
18. Id. at 466, 351 N.E.2d at 133.
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sion of the press from the court proceedings prevents the newspapers
from gathering information at its source and thereby inhibits the
press from exercising its constitutional guarantee fully. Therefore,
the court ruled, an exclusionary order even at the pretrial hearing
stage was inappropriate.
Justice Celebreeze, in a lengthy dissent, said that the exclusionary order was a legitimate method for protecting the defendant's
rights. Although he recognized that a change of venue could be used
to protect the defendant's rights, the Justice felt that the defendant
had a constitutional right to be tried in the locale where the crime
was allegedly committed."9 He stated that the press could be excluded, although only where highly prejudicial publicity was shown
to endanger the defendant's right to a fair trial. Therefore, he felt
that the court should have recognized an exclusionary order limited
to pretrial hearings as a viable method for guaranteeing the defendant a fair trial.
III.
A.

ANALYSIS

The Totality of the Circumstances Test

The majority in Dayton Newspapers sought to avoid the fair
trial-free press controversy by sanctioning the use of a change of
venue. The court correctly recognized that the Supreme Court of the
United States has placed its imprimatur upon change of venue as a
proper alternative for protecting the defendant's right to a fair
trial.2 ' The court, however, failed to recognize that the Supreme
Court has also acknowledged the trial court's inherent authority to
use other, appropriate means for protecting the defendant's rights.2'
As the Seventh Circuit stated:
That Courts have the duty to ensure fair trials-"the most fundamental of freedoms"-is beyond question. The Supreme Court made
19. The majority held that the defendant waived any right to be tried in the locale
where the alleged crime was committed because of his motion for a change of venue. OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.12(I) (Page 1975), cited by the majority, provides:
Notwithstanding any other requirement for the place of trial, venue may be changed
upon motion of. . . defense, . . . to any court having jurisdiction of the subject matter
outside the county in which trial would otherwise be held, when it appears that a fair
and impartial trial cannot be held in the jurisdiction in which trial would otherwise
be held. ...
Nevertheless, Justice Celebreeze stated: "We do not believe that the interests of justice
countenance the waiver of one constitutional right in order to secure another." 46 Ohio St.
2d at 526-27, 351 N.E.2d at 168. See Ohio v. Nevius, 147 Ohio St. 263 (1947) citing OHIo
CONST. art. I, § 10.
20. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
21. Id. See also Note, 21 DE PAUL L. REV. 822 (1972).
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this clear in Sheppard v. Maxwell. . . . Moreover, the Court in that
case settled the corollary proposition that Courts have the power to
"take such steps by rule and regulation that 22will protect their processes from prejudicial outside interferences."

The court in Dayton Newspapers found it significant that the
claims of prejudice by the defendant appeared to be only specula2
tive in nature. In Sheppard v. Maxwell, " however, the Supreme
Court held that identifiable prejudice is not needed, if the totality
2
of circumstances raises the possibility of prejudice. " The Sixth Cir5
2
cuit in Stone v. United States stated the applicable rule:
The question is, not whether any actual wrong resulted . . . , but
whether [the circumstances] created a condition from which prejudice might arise. . . . [T]he law concerning juries . . . presumes
may act on some of them . . . so as to be
that [outside] influence
2
1
detection.
beyond

To preserve the defendant's rights in the instant case, the trial
judge decided that based upon the totality of the circumstances, the
exclusion of the press was necessary. The facts surrounding Dayton
Newspapers provide justification for the trial court's action. The
victim was a prominent citizen of the Dayton community. The case
attracted not only local, but national news coverage. The local coverage was intense; i.e., over seventy-five articles appeared concerning the case in a period of forty-two days. The television media
actually engaged in a debate as to who was covering the event more
accurately. Furthermore, the media speculated on the admissibility
of evidence, various rules of law, and the defendant's background
and previous record.27 The rules of evidence confine the jury only to
22. Chicago Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 248 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
96 S. Ct. 3201 (1976).
23. 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
24. Id. at 352-53. Evidence exposed by the media may very well have been inadmissible
in court. If evidence which is unfavorable to the defendant is held to be inadmissible, such
evidence is very likely to be prejudicial. Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310 (1959);
United States v. Accardo, 298 F.2d 133 (7th Cir. 1962); Delaney v. United States, 199 F.2d
107 (1st Cir. 1952). See also Comment, The Case Against Trial by Newspaper. 57 Nw. U.L.
REV. 217 (1962).
25. 113 F.2d 70 (6th Cir. 1940); accord, Briggs v. United States, 221 F.2d 636, 638 (6th
Cir. 1955).
26. 113 F.2d at 77.
27. As stated by the dissent in Dayton Newspapers:
In the Thursday, October 2, 1975 edition of the Dayton Daily News appeared the
following paragraphs:
"It also has been learned that Scott [on] Wednesday failed to pass a lie detector
test to determine if he has told investigators the truth that he was involved in the
kidnapping but had no knowledge that Emoff would be killed and no role in the
slaying.
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those facts which are presented at trial." The accused will not have
a fair trial "unless the jury's verdict is based upon what they have
witnessed in the courtroom, not upon uncensored comments from
outside the court's walls."2 Under this test, then, it was clearly
established that the judicial process would be subverted by an open
hearing. As the Supreme Court stated in Estes v. Texas: 0 "[Tihe
criminal trial under our Constitution has a clearly defined purpose,
to provide a fair and reliable determination of guilt, and no procedure or occurrence which seriously threatens to divert it from that
purpose can be tolerated."'" Therefore, the trial judge's primary
obligation was to preserve the fairness and integrity of the judicial
process.
Although exclusion of the press and public has been used infrequently to protect a defendant's rights, those decisions32 using this
method do not necessarily downgrade the guarantees of the first
amendment. It is not every case in which the accused can convince
the court that publicity has jeopardized his right to a fair trial. The
burden is on the defendant to show "that a serious and imminent
The polygraph test which will not be admissible as evidence in court was administered Wednesday afternoon at the Dayton Police Department."
46 Ohio St. 2d at 517, 351 N.E.2d at 162.
The October 3rd and 4th editions of the Journal Herald had excerpts relating to the lie
detector. Furthermore, the newspapers alleged conspiracy, while also revealing the defendant's prior criminal record and linking him to unsolved crimes.
Most seriously damaging to the defendant's chance to receive a fair trial was a
series of articles appearing in both papers disclosing that the defendant was expected
to file motions "aimed at suppressing evidence against the men * * * includ[ing]
statements given by at least two of the suspects to the FBI." In this regard the November 5, 1975 edition of the Journal Herald reported that "taittorneys are especially
fearful of public hearing on a statement that defendant Herman Lee Moore gave to
police in which he allegedly implicated himself and the two other defendants," while
the Dayton Daily News on October 28, 1975 disclosed that "[attorneys for a defendant in the Lester C. Emoff kidnap-murder case today asked-that pretrial hearings
which will challenge the admissibility of evidence in the case, including a confession,
be closed to the public." 46 Ohio St. 2d at 518, 351 N.E.2d at'163.
Comparison of the publicity in the instant case and that in Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, at
725-26 shows remarkable similarity.
28. Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907).
29. Comment, The Press in a Black Robe, 45 CHI. KENT L. REV. 170 (1968). See Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907).
30. 381 U.S. 532 (1965).
31. Id. at 564 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
32. The following cases found in 49 A.L.R.2d 1014 held that the press could be excluded
where there is a clear and present danger to the orderly administration of justice: Phoenix
Newspapers, Inc. v. Jennings, 107 Ariz. 557, 490 P.2d 563 (1971); United Press Assns. v.
Valente, 308 N.Y. 71, 123 N.E.2d 777 (1954); State v. Meek, 9 Ariz. App. 149, 450 P.2d 115,
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 847 (1969); People v. Elliot, 54 Cal.2d 498, 354 P.2d 225, 6 Cal. Rptr.
753 (1960); People v. Pratt, 27 App. Div. 2d 199, 278 N.Y.S.2d 89 (1967); Azbill v. Fisher, 84
Nev. 414, 442 P.2d 916 (1968).
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threat to the fair administrationof justice exists which upon balance, outweighs the particular First Amendment guarantee
asserted.""' In Dayton Newspapers, the substantive evil to be eliminated was the interference with impartial adjudication. The threat
was imminent and serious, thus justifying the trial court's action.
Nevertheless, the Ohio Supreme Court was unwilling to accept such
a finding because an exclusionary order seemed to violate the freedom of the press as a form of prior restraint.
PriorRestraint and the Right of Access to Information
A prior restraint upon the press carries a heavy presumption
against constitutionality." Although the United States Supreme
Court has found direct prior restraints on the press to be unconstitutional," it has not acknowledged as absolute the first amendment
right of access to information." Justice Celebreeze in his dissent
noted:
The distinction between prior restraint cases and the cause at bar is
thus apparent: although the Constitution, except in limited circumstances, absolutely protects the right of the press to publish such
information as it possesses, the protection afforded by the Constitution to the concomitant right of the press to gather news for the
37
purpose of publication is not nearly so pervasive.
The view that limits the right of access to information is based upon
35
38
the holdings of Branzburg v. Hayes and Pell v. Procunier. In those
cases the Supreme Court held that the press has no greater status
in regard to accessibility than does the general public. Furthermore,
the first amendment guarantees to speak and publish do not encompass the absolute right to gather information. Although an exclusionary order may curtail the amount of information the press is
able to report, such an order does not infringe on the press' right to
print information obtained from other sources. The Court in
Branzburg was well aware of the fact that the news media's efforts
to report were hampered by its exclusion from grand jury proceed-

B.

33. 46 Ohio St. 2d at 515, 351 N.E.2d at 161 (court's emphasis).
34. N.Y. Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Organization for a Better Austin
v. O'Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971); Bantam Books Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963);
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
35. Id.
36. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972);
see Tribune Review Publishing Co. v. Thomas, 254 F.2d 883 (3d Cir. 1958); United Press
Assns. v. Valente, 308 N.Y. 71, 123 N.E.2d 777 (1954).
37. 46 Ohio St. 2d at 509, 351 N.E.2d at 158 (citations omitted).

38. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
39. 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
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ings, judicial conferences, and meetings of other official bodies.
Nevertheless, the Court noted: "Newsmen have no constitutional
right of access to scenes of crime or disaster when the general public
is excluded, and they may be prohibited from attending or publishing information about trials if such restrictions are necessary to
assure a defendant a fair trial before an impartialjury."4'
The Supreme Court in its most recent pronouncement,
Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart,' retreated somewhat from
that position, but only as to restrictions on actual publication. In
that case the Court held that a "gag order," which prohibited the
press from publishing accounts of confessions made by the accused
to law enforcement officials, was tantamount to a direct prior restraint and therefore constitutionally impermissible. The Court
ruled that measures short of an order restraining all publication
could insure the defendant a fair trial. Nebraska Press expressly left
open the issue of whether the press could be constitutionally excluded from pretrial hearings." Justice Celebreeze's dissenting
opinion is thus consistent with Nebraska Press which was decided
after Dayton Newspapers. It should be noted that Dayton
Newspapers involved access to information on matters of public
concern rather than a direct prohibition on freedom of expression in
the form of news publications. Therefore, an exclusionary order is,
at least arguably, not equivalent to a prior restraint, nor an infringement of the first amendment.
Since Dayton Newspapers involved a pretrialsuppression hearing, there is additional justification for the exclusion of the press.
The Supreme Court has recognized the importance of the pretrial
period. In Estes v. Texas43 the Court noted that "[p]retrial can
create a major problem for the defendant in a criminal case. Indeed
it may be more harmful than publicity during trial for it may well
set the community opinion as to guilt or innocence." In White v.
Maryland44 and Hamilton v. Alabama " the Court held that an accused is entitled to procedural due process protections not only at
40.
41.
42.

Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 684-85. (emphasis added).
96 S. Ct. 2791 (1976).
Id. at 2805 n.8:
Closing of pretrial proceedings with the consent of the defendant when required
is also recommended in guidelines that have emerged from various studies. At oral
argument petitioners' counsel asserted that judicially imposed restraints on lawyers
and others would be subject to challenge as interfering with the press' right to news
sources . . .We ore not now confronted with such issues. (emphasis added).
43. 381 U.S. 532 at 536.
44. 373 U.S. 59 (1963).
45. 368 U.S. 52 (1961).
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his trial and conviction but also at pretrial hearings. Inadequate
protection at the pretrial stage can have a devastating impact on a
4
defendant's right to a fair trial. " Exclusion of the public at pretrial
suppression hearings is consistent with the fact that a number of
judicial proceedings are closed to the public and the press. Prelimi49
nary hearings, 7 grand jury proceedings," and juvenile hearings can
be closed for the benefit of the parties involved because of their
potential for prejudicial publicity. Since both preliminary hearings
and grand jury proceedings act as screening devices to ferret out
unjustified prosecutions, it is necessary that they be held in secret.
In a similar sense, a suppression hearing is used to ferret out questionable evidence and rule upon its admissibility at trial as a matter
of law. Because of speculation by the press, the public may prejudge
the evidence without the benefit of well-established rules of evidence. Acceptable jurors must not have formed conclusions as to
evidence before the start of the trial; publicity works against that
end by narrowing the group of potential jurors.
The American Bar Association has recognized the hazards of
0
pretrial publicity and has recommended standards which would
accomodate the press as well as protect the rights of the defendant.
ABA standard 3.151 recommends that in pretrial hearings, including
a hearing on a motion to suppress evidence,
the defendant may move that all or any part of the hearing be held
in chambers or otherwise closed to the public [including representatives of the news media] on the ground that dissemination of the
evidence or argument adduced at the hearing may disclose matters
that will be inadmissible in evidence at the trial and is therefore
likely to interfere with his right to a fair trial by an impartial jury.
The standards require that a complete record of all proceedings be
46. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1964).
47. State v. Meek, 9 Ariz. App. 149, 450 P.2d 115, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 847 (1969).
See also Comment, Fair Trial and Free Press: PreliminaryHearing-Gateway to Prejudice,
1973 LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 903 (1973).
48. OHIO R. CRIM. P. 6(D), 6(E).
49. OHIO R. Juv. P. 27. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.35 (Page 1975) provides:
The juvenile court may conduct its hearings in an informal manner and may
adjourn such hearings from time to time. In the hearing of any case the general public
may be excluded and only such persons admitted as have a direct intereot in the case

50.

ABA

RELATING
LEGAL ADVISORY COMM. ON FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS, STANDARDS

To FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS. (Approved Draft 1968).
PROCEEDINGS
51. Id. PART III: RECOMMENDATIONS RELATING TO THE CONDUCT OF JUDICIAL

IN CRIMINAL CASES. Standard 3.5(d) of this report further provides for closing portions of the
actual trial when necessary.
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kept and made available to the public following the completion of
the trial.
C.

Public Trial
The press also argued against the exclusionary order on the
basis of the constitutional guarantee of a "public trial." Criminal
defendants are guaranteed a public trial by the sixth amendment
to the United States Constitution" and similar provisions in the
Ohio Constitution."' The newspapers contended that this right embodied not only the right of the accused, but also a concomitant
right of the public to be present at judicial proceedings. The right
to a public trial is grounded in the historical abhorrence of secret
trials. Since the right is based upon the theory that the defendant's
rights may be abused if the trial were held in secret, it is more
accurately viewed as a right of the accused rather than the right of
the public." It is the accused who would suffer if the public were
excluded from all judicial proceedings, for the public would be denied the opportunity to scrutinize the operation of the judicial system and voice objection to miscarriages of justice. Further, our
scheme of justice allows the accused to confront his accusers in open
court before an unbiased jury. At a pretrial suppression hearing, the
defendant should be able to waive the right to a public trial when
highly prejudicial publicity casts a shadow over his right to a fair
trial.
Upon the defendant's motion to close the hearings, the court
must determine whether a clear and present danger to the orderly
administration of justice is present based upon the totality of the
circumstances. If the court finds such danger to be serious and
imminent, it is then justified in exercising its inherent authority to
52. The sixth amendment right to a "public trial" has yet to be applied to the
individual states. See Gaines v. Washington, 277 U.S. 81 (1928).
53. OHIo CONST. art. I, § 16 provides:
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done him in his land,
goods, persons, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law and shall
have
justice administered without denial or delay. ...
OHIO CONST. art. I, § 10 further provides:
In any trial, in court, the party accused shall be allowed to appear and defend in person
and with counsel; to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him,
and
to have a copy thereof; to meet the witnesses . . . in his behalf, and a speedy trial
by
an impartial jury of the county in which the offense is alleged to have been committed. . ..
54. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. at 536-44; Geise v. United States, 265 F.2d 659,
660 (9th
Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 842 (1959); United States v. Sorrentino, 175 F.2d
721, 72223 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 868 (1949); cf. People v. Blanco, 170 Cal. App.
2d 758,
339 P.2d 906 (1959); Henderson v. State, 207 Ga. 206, 60 S.E.2d 345 (1950).
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close the courtroom. This does not mean that the defendant can
choose a private trial to the detriment of the public's right to know.
Rather, the defendant's right to a fair trial simply outweighs the
public's right to know. The public interest is adequately protected
by the power of the trial judge to deny the defendant's motion if it
55
is determined that the case is not a proper one for exclusion. Moreover, a complete record of the proceedings must be kept and made
available at the disposition of the case. Thus, public awareness is
kept intact." To hold that the media could demand a public trial
would be "[t]o deny the right of waiver [and] . . . 'convert a
privilege into an imperative requirement' to the disadvantage of the
accused."-"
IV.

CONCLUSION

Although the Ohio Supreme Court recognized the validity of
using change of venue as a method for protecting the defendant's
right to a fair trial, it failed to accept the viability of an exclusionary
order limited to pretrial hearings. The court hesitated to add to the
traditional curative techniques one of equal effectiveness. Though
the court sanctioned change of venue, it refused to accept the fact
that such a procedure involves unnecessary delay, expense, inconvenience, as well as abrogation of the defendant's right to a speedy
trial. Likewise, certain crimes tend to attract nationwide coverage
regardless of the location of the trial. For those crimes, "spatial
separation from the locus of the crime does not necessarily guaran5
tee isolation from prejudicial news coverage."
An exclusionary order at the pretrial stage can be easily administered, guaranteeing at least in part the defendant's right to a fair
trial. The order can be granted without infringing upon the right of
the press while at the same time curbing prejudicial publicity at its
inception. The Supreme Court of Ohio failed to bear in mind the
admonition of the nation's highest Court in Sheppard v. Maxwell:
"[T]he presence of the press at judicial proceedings must be limited when it is apparent that the accused might otherwise be prejudiced or disadvantaged." 5 9
James L. Rados
55. United Press Assns. v. Valente, 308 N.Y. 71, 81-82, 123 N.E.2d 777 (1954).
56. ABA LEGAL ADVISORY COMM., supra note 50, § 3.1 at 113.
57. United States v. Sorrentino, 175 F.2d 721, 723 (3d Cir. 1949).
58. United States ex rel. Rosenberg v. Mancusi, 445 F.2d 615, 617 (2d Cir. 1971).
59. Sheppard, 384 U.S. at 358. See also Warren and Abell, Free Press-FairTrial, 45 S.
CAL. L. REV. 51 (1972).
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